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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MILTON CURTIS ZUMBRUNNEN

'

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

CASE NO.
12754

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Milton Curtis Zumbrunnen, appeals from
a decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying his
release from the Utah State Prison upon a petition for writ
of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On September 21, 197 l, Milton Curtis Zumbrunnen filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that his commitment to the Utah State Prison was invalid. An amended
petition was filed on November 12, 1971. The matter came
on for hearing on November 18, 1971, before Judge Ernest
F. Baldwin, Jr., who denied the petition on November 29,
1971.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, John W. Turner, requests that the judgment
and order of the Court below be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 5, 1971, in the District Court of Wasatch
County, State of Utah, appellant pleaded guilty to the
charge of second degree burglary and two other counts of
second degree burglary were dismissed (R. 27, 28, Exhibit
1-P, pp.5,7). When appellant pleaded guilty to the second
degree burglary charge, he stated that no one had applied
any pressure to get him to plead guilty (Exhibit 1-P, p.2 ).
He stated, further, that no promises had been made to him
except that two other counts of burglary would be dismissed if he pleaded guilty (Exhibit 1-P, p.4). The court asked
appellant if he understood that he had the right to a trial by
jury (Exhibit 1-P, p. l ). He was told on two other occasions
that his guilty plea would take the place of a trial by jury
(Exhibit 1-P, pp.2, 7). The court asked appellant if he wanted to change his plea from his previous not guilty plea
(Exhibit 1-P, pp.4,5). Appellant was asked ifhe knew what
he was charged with and the charge was explained to him by
the court (Exhibit 1-P, pp.3 ,4 ). Appellant was asked if he
had discussed the matter of his plea thoroughly with his attorney and he stated: "Yes, we have." (Exhibit 1-P,p.3).
Appellant was then asked his age and whether he entered
the house with intent to steal, to which he answered by describing the events that happened during the burglary (Exhibit 1-P, pp.4,5).
At the habeas corpus hearing on November 18,1971, appellant was represented by counsel, James R. Hall (R.27).
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Mr. Jlall testified that appellant and four other defendants
had asked him to represent them in connectiqn with the ·
burglary charge (R.30). Mr. Hall also testified that he had
numerous discussions with the defendant regarding his
rights and plea of guilty (R.28,29). Appellant also testified
at the habeas corpus hearing that he and the codefendants
had asked Mr. Hall to represent them (R.32). Appellant further testified ( 1) that he understood that two charges of
burglary would be dropped if he pleaded guilty to one, and
(2) that he would be "sentenced to the same thing" if he
pleaded guilty as he would if he were convicted by a jury
(R.42).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
The petitioner relies on Boykin v. A/a,bama, 395 U.S.
238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) to require that
constitutional rights must be individually described and explained before an accused may waive his rights. Respondent
to waive constitutional
contends
that -this is not required
.
rights. The case involved a robbery wherein the defendant
pleaded guilty to a robbery charge. In discussing the rights
involved in a waiver when a guilty plea is entered, there are
three constitutional rights that are present. First, there is
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Second is the right to trial
by jury. Third is the right to confront one's accusers. In
-
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order to waive these rights, a guilty plea must be voluntarily and intelligently made. The problem is to determine
from the record in the present case whether the guilty plea
was voluntary and intelligent.
In deciding whether a plea is voluntary, it is proper to
consider all the circumstances. Boykin, supra, was not the
only case to discuss these constitutional rights. In Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747
(1970) the Supreme Court established the test when it stated:
"The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all the relevant circumstances surrounding it." 397 U.S. at 749.
The Brady Court in its opinion discussed the requirement
that the guilty plea be intelligently made. In discussing the
case, the court said:
"The record before us also supports the conclusion that Brady's plea was intelligently made. He
was advised by competent counsel, he was made
aware of the nature of the charge against him, and
there was nothing to indicate that he was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental facilities . . . Brady was aware of precisely what he was
doing." 497 U.S. at 749.

Boykin, supra, did not change the law concerning a guilty
plea but as the court noted in footnote 4 of Brady:
"The new element added in Boykin was the requirement that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily."
497 U.S. at 747.
In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160,
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27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), the Supreme Court again stated this
test:
"The standard was and remains whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among
the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." 400 U.S. at 164.
The A Iford court went on to say:
"That he (Alford) would not have pleaded except
for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty
does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea ot
guilty was not the product of a free and rational
choice, especially where the defendant was represented by competent counsel whose advice was that
the plea would be to the defendant's advantage."
400 U.S. at 31.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously decided that a
desire to free a codefendant represented by the same counsel, from a felony charge does not make a guilty plea involuntary. This Court decided in Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah
2d 397, 483 P.2d 437 (1971) that the defendant, Combs,
voluntarily and
entered a· plea of guilty
where it was agreed that charges against his wife, who was
represented by the same counsel, would be dismissed after
his plea. The Combs court stated:
"To us the evidence at the time of plea is clear
that Mr. Combs was adequately represented by
counsel and that he knowingly, understandingly and
voluntarily entered the plea of guilty. True it is that
one of his motives was to free his wife from the felony charge but a bargain to that effect with the district attorney does not necessarily amount to coercion." 483 P.2d at 438. See also McGuffey v.
Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P .2d 166 (1967).
In McGuffey v.

Turner,

267 F .Supp. 136 (1967),

6

1udge Christensen concurred with this court's decision in
McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967).
Both cases invoived the same parties and reviewed the same
guilty plea of McGuffey and held that it was voluntarily and
intelligently entered. McGuffey waived his right to counsel
and pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery. In the Federal
District Court Judge Christensen stated:
1

"One properly advised may enter a plea of guilty
in the belief that a favorable result to others may be
a· product of the plea without throwing into question the validity of the plea." 467 F.Supp. at 140.
Thus, the Court found the following criteria relevant to
the decision:
"I find in this respect that prior to the entry of
his plea he (McGuffey) was told that if he plead
guilty the charge against his wife probably would be
dismissed, that this was a development genuinely
desired by the petitioner and that it was a consideration which he had in mind when he entered the plea.
I further, find, however, that there were considerations which led to the entry of the petitioner's plea
of guilty including his own belief that he was guilty,
a realization that it would be futile to contest the
matter, and his desire to get the proceedings over
with by reason of his hoped for probation." 467
F.Supp. at 141.
In the present case, the court below inquired thoroughly
into the motives of appellant for changing his plea. The
court asked appellant if he had discussed his plea with his
counsel (E. 1-P, p.3). Mr. Hall testified that he had discussed the matter numerous times with appellant (R.28,29).
The court below asked whether anyone forced appellant to
change his plea and explained the crime for which he was
charged (Exhibit 1-P, p.7). Appellant was advised that he
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had a right to a jury trial yet entered a plea of guilty (Exhibit 1-P, p. 5,7). The record clearly shows that Zumbrunnen
was aware of precisely what he was doing when he pleaded
guilty. The record in this case meets the test of Boykin,
Brady, and Alford, supra, by showing that Zumbrunnen
made an intelligent and voluntary choice, with the advice of
competent counsel, based on his expressed reasons that he
desired to be incarcerated in Utah rather than Minnesota,
and two charges of burglary would be dismissed, and that a
favorable result to others would be a product of his plea
(R.28, 41 ). Therefore, the judgment below should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE
JOINT REPRESENTATION OF CO DEFENDANTS BY
HIS COUNSEL DID NOT DENY APPELLANT ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Respondent contends that the appellant received adequate and effectivt assistance of counsel. He further contends that joint representation of codefendants by appellant's counsel did not result in a conflict of interest and,
therefore, his guilty plea was voluntarily understandingly
and intelligently entered. Thus, the judgment below should
be affirmed.
Contrary to the position taken by appellant, it is recognized that common representation of criminal defendants
by single counsel is permissible. In United States ex. rel.
Sma/lv. Rundle, 442 F. 2d 235 (3rd Cir. 1971) the court

a
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upheld this practice where petitioner and a codefendant
were simultaneously represented by a single attorney in a
prosecution for assault, battery, rape, and other crimes.
The court said that:
"It merits statement at the outset that dual representation of criminal defendants tried together
is not necessarily a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel." 442
F. 2d at 237.

While the United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that an attorney is not to represent codefendants where a
conflict of interest actually exists in Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. ed 680 (1941 ),
respondent contends that Glasser, supra, does not control
the case before this court. In Glasser, supra, the conflict
held to prejudice the defendant occurred during the trial.
Classer's counsel was found to have been impaired in his
cross examination of witnesses because of his dual representation. This situation did not arise in appellant's case.
Appellant avoided any conflict at trial by pleading guilty to
the burglary charge. Any advice given to appellant by Mr.
Hall could be based on an objective evaluation of appellant's defenses and probability of being released without
compromising Mr. Hall's duty to the codefendants.
The mere existence of a potential conflict does not require this court to set aside appellant's guilty plea. In
United States v. Williams, 429 F. 2d 158 (8th Cir. 1970),
Williams appealed from a conviction of transporting a stolen
motor vehicle. Williams and a codefendant plead guilty to
the crime. The court held that it was not reversible error
for the trial court to deny a request by Williams' attorney
that separate counsel be appointed. The Williams' court
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said:
"In short, we are faced in this case with but a
bald assertion and conclusory statement made by
court appointed counsel at arraignment, that a conflict of interest between two codefendants was a
possibility in futuro. From this speculative assertion, appellant maintains that the district court committed prejudicial error in peremptorily denying appointment of separate counsel without 'inform
(ing) the defendants of their right to have individual
counsel, or indicat (ing) to defendants the dangers
and problems existing for two defendants who are
represented by the same attorney.' We cannot ascribe reversible error to the district court's action."
429 F. 2d at 160.
The Williams' court then stated:
"As shown above, there is nothing pointing to an
actual or a substantial possibility of a conflict of
interest between appellant and his codefendant,
Brinkley. We need go no further. A reversal here
would be tantamount to holding that joint representation is illegal per se, a result not mandated by
the Sixth Amendment, Glasser, or its progeny." 429
F.2datl61.
This court has already faced the issue raised by appellant
that dual representation of codefendant's denies a defendant
the effective assistance of counsel. See Combs v. Turner, 25
U. 2d 397, 483 P. 2d 437 (1971) discussed in Point I, supra,
and decided no conflict resulted.
In State v. Bible, 77 Wash. 2d 69, 459, P. 2d 646 (1969),
the court held defendants right to effective counsel was not
denied. The Bible court stated:
"Representation of defendants by the same attorney who represented his codefendant did not deny
the defendant benefit of effective counsel where de-
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fondant never asked for separate counsel, never indicated in what respect his interests were in conflict
with those of codefendant, and never registered dissatisfaction with his counsel." 459 P. 2d at 647.
Appellant relies on Lollar v. United States, 376 F. 2d
243, (D.C. Cir. 1967) as prescribing the test to be used in
deciding that some prejudice resulted from joint representation by Mr. Hall. (Appellant's Brief p. 13). Other courts
have refused to follow Lollar and require that an actual conflict resulting in prejudice must exist. In Carlson v. Nelson,
443 F. 2d 21 (9th Cir. 1971) the court said:
"The (Lollar) test does not apply in the Ninth
Circuit. In this Circuit counsel may represent more
than one defendant if the interests of the latter are
not in conflict." 443 F. 2d at 22.
The Carlson court then said:
"This is not to be decided on the basis of speculation, but by a considered determination of
whether, in fact, a conflict of interest existed." 443
F. 2d at 22.
Fryor v. United States, 404 F. 2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968)
appear to require that an actUal conflict exists as well. The
Fryor court stated:

"It has been clear since Glasser (supra), that the
Sixth Amendment is not violated by joint representation of codefendants unless a conflict of interest or prejudice results from such procedure." 404
F. 2d at 1073.
The record indicates that no conflict of interest between
appellant and his codefendants existed. Mr. Hall advised appellant of the probability of conviction and incarceration.
(R. 28, 29). The record shows that appellant was asked nu-
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merous times if it were his desire to plead guilty. (Exhibit
1-P, p. 2, 4, 5, 7). Appellant requested that Mr. Hall represent him. (R.30). Two other charges of burglary against
the appellant were dismissed (R.28). These facts indicate
that appellant had ample opportunity to decide between alternate courses of action, that he made a voluntary and intelligent choice between alternatives with the advice of competent counsel and that appellant knew precisely what he
was doing when he plead guilty.
CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that no conflict of interest existed between appellant and his codefendants; that appellant
was not prejudiced by Mr. Hall's dual representation of codef endants; that appellant has failed to give reasons sufficient to warrant this his guilty plea be set aside.
For the reasons and analysis above stated, this appeal
should not .be granted and the judgment and order of the
court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
LARRY V. LUNT
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Attorneys for Respondent

